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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(4) as this is an appeal of a final order of the Fourth District Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1422 - Reinstatement following dissolution.
(4) When the reinstatement is effective, it relates back to the effective date of the
administrative dissolution. Upon reinstatement:
(a) an act of the corporation during the period of dissolution is effective and
enforceable as if the administrative dissolution had never occurred; and
(b) the corporation may carry on its business, under the name stated pursuant
to Subsection (l)(d), as if the administrative dissolution had never occurred.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Express Recovery Services brought this contract action against Scott Rice (Rice)
personally, doing business at MTI, for failure to pay for advertising services to Phone
Directories Company, Inc. (Directories). Rice signed the contract as president of MTI.
When this action was filed, a check with the Utah Department of Commerce found several
business listings containing the initials MTI, however, none of the listings had an address
even close to the address listed on the advertising contract between Directories and MTI and
none were associated with Scott Rice. Further, all of the listings for MTI were showing an
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"expired" status. Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss advancing the same arguments made
in this appeal and stated the suit should have been filed against the corporation which was
actually named Memory Technology Inc. (Memory). Appellee filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss arguing that the advertising contract makes no mention of Memory but
states only MTI and that the creditor should be able to rely on the information provided by
the advertiser on the contract. Further, Memory was administratively dissolved when this
action was filed. The court denied Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and the matter was set for
Trial. At the time of trial, Memory had been reinstated as a valid corporation. The case was
tried as a bench trial to the Honorable John C. Backlund who found that Rice had personally
guaranteed the contract through a provision in the contract. The Court awarded costs and
attorney fees. Rice appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Rice signed a contract with Phone Directories as president of MTI and

MTI has never been listed as a corporation with the Utah Department of Commerce,
(Commerce) nor has it ever been listed as a D.B.A. with Commerce. (Addendum:
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss).
2.

Memory was administratively dissolved at the time this action was

commenced and was subsequently re-instated at the time of the bench trial.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rice signed a contract with Directories and acknowledged that if MTI "discontinues
business" he guaranteed payment. No business named MTI has never been incorporated and
as a "non existent corporation" Rice is personally liable. Because Memory had been
administratively dissolved, the trial Court found this event to trigger the personal guarantee
of Rice. Counsel for Memory argued that its subsequent reinstatement eliminated any
possible personal liability and the Court disagreed. The Court held that the purpose of Utah
Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-1422(4) is to protect those dealing with a dissolved entity; not to protect
individuals attempting to escape personal liability by reinstating the entity.
ARGUMENT
I.

SCOTT RICE IS THE PROPER PARTY BECAUSE MTI IS A NON
EXISTENT CORPORATION AND IS NOT LISTED WITH THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

"All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was
no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created
while so acting." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-204. Rice signed the advertising contract with
Directories as president of a non-existent corporation. He signed as president of MTI not
as president of Memory. MTI has never been incorporated with the Utah Department of
Commerce and further, MTI has never been listed as a d.b.a. with the department. Appellant
did not list the business name as Memory anywhere on the contract. Directories and
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Appellee are entitled to rely on the information provided directly on the contract and
endorsed by Appellant.
These facts were presented on Appellant's Motion to Dismiss with the trial court and
no evidence was presented to the contrary. Appellee acknowledges that the trial court's
findings do not address these facts and interchange MTI with Memory. However, this Court
is free to take judicial notice of Department of Commerce records and to review Appellee's
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. This could also present the Court with alternate
grounds to affirm the trial court.
II.

THE
DISTRICT
COURT WAS CORRECT
IN
ITS
FINDING/CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT RICE WAS
PERSONALLY LIABLE WHEN HE SIGNED A PERSONAL
GUARANTEE AND BECAUSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DISSOLUTION OF MEMORY TECHNOLOGY INC

Assuming this Court does not agree that Rice signed the contract as president of a
non-existent corporation, there are other grounds to affirm the trial court. Appellant has
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. As such, this Court
must accept the trial courts findings. This Court should not reverse the findings of fact of
the trial court sitting without a jury unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence,
thus clearly erroneous. MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995).
Appellant begins his argument by stating there is no finding or conclusion that Rice
signed the contract individually, nor is there any finding or conclusion of an express
guarantee. This is not the case. The trial court's finding of fact \ 12 states the court "finds
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that the contract provides that the signor of the contract promises to personally guarantee
payment of the obligation created thereby in the event the corporate obligor sells or
discontinues the business." The trial court continues in Finding ^ 13 that pursuant to the
contract, personal liability on behalf of the signor (Rice) is triggered if the business is sold
or discontinued.
Paragraph 11 of the contract between Rice and Directories states as follows:
11. If advertiser (MTI) sells or discontinues business
before or after publication of the Directory, no payment or
amount due under the terms of this contract will be waived
thereby. The signer of the contract guarantees payment of the
amount due either directly, or through escrow if business is
sold. Payment or amount due may be assumed by the New
Owner, if name of business and phone number remain the same.
Contract interpretation may be a question of fact determined by intrinsic evidence of
intent, or a question of law. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). The
Court found Rice, as signer of the contract, personally guaranteed the contract if one of two
conditions were met: (1) MTI is sold: or (2) MTI discontinues business. The Court found
Rice personally liable "at the time the corporation was involuntarily dissolved." (Findings
UK 12-14, Conclusions ^ 5).
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-204 provides: "All persons purporting to act as or on
behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly
and severally liable for all liabilities created while so acting." Utah case law has extended
this statute to include post dissolution situations but has not reviewed a fact pattern such as
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the present case where Memory subsequently re-instated its corporate status. See Steenblik
v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995); Miller v. Celebration Mining, 2001 UT 64,29 P.3d
1231.
The Oregon Supreme Court faced this issue in Lents, Inc., v. Borstad, 251 Or. 296;
445 P.2d 597 (Oregon 1968). The facts in Borstad art strikingly similar. Borstad contended
that any liability incurred was absolved by the subsequent reinstatement of the corporation.
The Oregon Court was unpersuaded and found no merit in that position.
If we adopted Borstad's view, the directors of a corporation
could permit it to be dissolved, dissipate its assets, and then
escape liability to the stockholders and creditors by simply
reinstating the corporate franchise. The mere statement of the
proposition demonstrates its fallacy. We are not concerned with
the validation of corporate acts between dissolution and
reinstatement.
Borstad at 299
The trial Court concluded that because suit was brought prior to the reinstatement of
MTI that Rice was the proper and only party defendant. "As the signer of the contract
containing a personal guarantee effective if the corporate entity "'discontinues business'"
he became liable at the time the corporation was involuntarily dissolved. (Conclusion of
Law TI 5). The Court further reasoned that it was not the intent of the legislature to relieve
individuals of obligations incurred during a period of dissolution under Utah Code Ann. §
16-10a-1422(4). (Conclusion of Law ^ 5). "The purpose of Section 16-10a-1422(4) is to
protect those dealing with the entity while it is dissolved not to protect individuals that may
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seek to escape personal liability by reinstating the entity after incurring personal liability."
Id.
This is precisely what Rice attempted to do. Once the trigger of a personal guarantee
was met, Rice set out to reinstate his corporation to escape personal liability. Again, this is
the same tactic feared by the Oregon court in Lents, Inc., v. Borstad.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings are not against the clear weight of the evidence and
therefore this Court should affirm the district court's decision, which includes an award of
attorney fees as provided in the original contract.
DATED this &• day of May, 2005.

Edwin B. Parry
Samuel S. McHenry
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ O day of May, 2005.1 caused to be mailed via U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES to the following:
Blake S.Atkin •
Atkin & Shields P.C.
136 South Main, Suite 610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant
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TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1 Publisher shad hereinafter mean Phone Directones Co Inc and Advertiser shall
mean individual, DBA partnership, association joint stock company or corporation
authonztng listings and/or advertising in this Directory Directory hereinafter shall
mean project authonzed by the Advertiser to be produced by the Publisher This appli
cation will became a contract when signed by the Advertiser and accepted by the
Publisher Neither party shall be bound by any oral agreements or special arrange
ments contrary to or in addition to the terms and conditions as stated herein or wnrten
hereon and no agent or employee of the publisher has the authonty to vary any terms
of this application
2 Unless otherwise agreed upon and specified in wntmg, terms are net cash wtth
copy If a statement is required, a live dollar billing charge will be added This charge
may be deducted if payment is made within 10 days after receiving statement Interest
will be charged at the rate of 1 5 percent per month on overdue accounts once the
book is published
3 Advertisers will be sent one venflcation copy for each different display or in column
a d Changes can be made to the ad copy at that time If proof is mailed to an advertiser and said proof is not returned by advertiser within the time set forth on the proof
sheet, it Is mutually understood and agreed that said proof shall be assumed to be cor
reel Changes to ad copy must be received m wntmg by the deadline specified on the
proof copy Changes received over the phone will be made at the Publisher's discretion The publisher reserves the nght to refuse changes received after this deadline

6 The Publisher reserves the nght to extend or re-^ce by not more than six (6)
months the issue date and penod of the Directory In no e*\^nt shall the issue date of
the Directory be later than December 31 of the year succeeding the year in which this,
contract is entered into by the Advertiser and Publisher
^
7 If an error in or omission of the advertisement occurs because of the negligence o(
the Publisher, in no event shall the Publishers liability exceed the amount paid or
payable by Ihe advertiser for the item or items omitted, or in which errors occur for the
life of the issue of the directory involved If an error should occur in display advertis
mg, the following adjustment by publisher wilt only be considered
a. Wrong main number
100%
b Wrong alternate call number
15%
c Wrong address
up to 25%
d Incorrect spelling of a business name up to 25%
e Incorrect spelling of a word
none
No adjustment will be considered on free classifications,
8 In the event oi a dispute arising out of this contract the parties agree that Utah law
is to be applied
9 The person signing this contract warrants that he has authonty for and in behaif of
the Advertiser to do so In addition, the signer, on behalf of the Advertiser, represents
and warrants that he is a Duly Authonzed Agent for the Product or Service to be adver
\ised and that the use of any Trade Mark, Logo or Trade Name appearing in the
Advertising hereby contracted for has been authorized by the Owner or Owners there
of The Advertiser agrees that he will hold the Publisher harmless from any and afl
claims and demands asserted against the Publisher by reason of the falsity of any portion of said advertising or the unauthonzed use of any Trade Mark, Logo, Copynght or
Trade Name therein

The firm name, address, and telephone number as shown on the face of this contract
is the cntena for correctness In each directory as subscribed Publisher is not responsible for telephone number changes made by any party It is the responsibility of the
advertiser to inform the publisher in writing of any change in address or telephone
number sixty (60) days pnor to any directory issue date
4 tf It becomes necessary to employ legal or other services to obtain payment of any
account when past due, Advertiser agrees to pay ait costs for collection of said
account including but not limited to attorney fees and court costs incurred in the codec
tion of said delinquent account Discounts and special promotions will only be honored
on current accounts Should an account become delinquent, full retail pnee will be
immediately assessed If advertiser has any account past due with publisher, the publisher, at its sole discretion may apply any deposits or payments made be advertiser
under this contract to said past due accounts or payments due publisher Excess funds
will thereafter be credited to current contract account

10 Cancellation may be made by the Advertiser providing such notice of cancellation
is made in wnting and received by the Publisher within Ten (10) days of the date of ths
contract No cancellations will be accepted after this time

5. The Publisher reserves the right to reject any or aD advertising copy Failure to furnish copy grves the Publisher the nght to make up copy No specific position for display advertising is guaranteed

12 Reasonable care is taken to s e e that the directory delivery is accurate However,
Publisher does not guarantee a 100% delivery accuracy

11 if Advertiser sells or discontinues business before or after publication of the
Directory, no oayment or amount due under the terms of this contract will be waived
thereby The signer of the contract guarantees payment of the amount due either
directly, or through escrow if business is sold Payment or amount due may be
assumed by the New Owner, if name of business and phone number remain the same
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EXHIBIT B

Blake S. Atkin #4466
Lonn Litchfield #
ATKJN & HAWKINS, P.C.
136 South Main, 6,h Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Fax: (801) 533-080
Attorneys for Scott Rice
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.
A Debt Collection Agency

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
v.

CivilNo.030200718

SCOTT RICE, dba MTI
32 East Red Pine Dr.
Alpine, UT 84004

Judge Backhand

Defendant.
This complaint is brought against Scott Rice dba MTI. However, MTI is a Utah
Corporation, MTI, Inc, The contract (which was never fully executed) is signed by Scott Rice,
President Moreover, the ad which Plaintiffs predecessor printed without Mr. Rice's approval
identifies the customer as 4<MTI, Inc." It is frivolous under these circumstances to have brought
this complaint against Mr. Rice personally.
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56 states:
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense

to the action was without merit and not brought or asseited in good
faith. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 paragraph 1.
See Reedeken v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 5S2 (Ut. App. 1998). The complaint should be
dismissed and Plaintiffs ordered to pay Defendant's attorney's fees m opposing the complaint.
DATED this _ ^ _ day of May, 2003.
ATKIN & HAWKINS, P.C.

Blake At
Lonn LitcMeld
Attorneys Cor Scott Rice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS were mailed first class, postage prepaid this J
the following:
Edwin B. Parry
3788 West 2340 South, Suite B
J.Q. Adams Building
West Valley City, Utah 84120

day of May, 2003 to

EXHIBIT C

EDWIN B. PARRY [#2532]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3782 West 2340 South, Suite B
J.Q. Adams Building
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 486-2942
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,
A Debt Collection Agency.
Plaintiff
OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS
Civil No: 030200718
SCOTT RICE d.b.a. MTI,
Defendant/s Judge: John C Backlund
COMES NOW the plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby submits its
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set forth herein:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Scott Rice entered into an advertising contract with Phone Directories Co. on

October 13, 2001. See Exhibit A.
2.

The name on the contract was listed as "MTI" and Scott Rice signed said contract in his

capacity of President of the Company. See Exhibit A.
3.

Defendant failed to pay for said advertising and the outstanding debt was assigned to

Plaintiff for collection of the account. See Exhibit B.
4.

Plaintiff found it necessary to file suit after their attempts to collect were unsuccessful.

5.

The account was referred to Plaintiffs counsel in order to file suit.

6.

Plaintiffs counsel performed a search with the Utah Department of Commerce and found

several listings for businesses containing the initials of "MTI". None of the businesses were listed
at the same address provided by Defendant on the contract and all of the businesses with the name
containing "MTI" had an expired status with the Department of Commerce. See Exhibit C.

7.

Plaintiff then filed suit against Defendant Scott Rice d.b.a. MTL See Plaintiffs Complaint.

8.

Defendant's counsel contacted Plaintiffs office and insisted that the complaint be dismissed

because the business was an active corporation listed with the State of Utah as "Memory
Technology, Inc." See Affidavit of Ramona Andrus.
9.

Plaintiffs counsel conducted a search with the Utah Department of Commerce and found

that Memory Technology, Inc. is a Utah Corporation with an expired status for failure to file its
annual renewal. Said Corporation has been expired since October 23, 2002. See Exhibit D.
10.

The contract signed by defendant Scott Rice deems that the signer "guarantees payment1' in

the event that the company is sold or discontinues doing business, See Exhibit A.
ARGUMENT
Defendant Scott Rice is personally liable for the outstanding amounts owing to Phone
Directories Co.
Defendant argues in his Motion to Dismiss that the company, MTI, Inc. is liable for the debt,
however, there is no such company or corporation in existence according to the State of Utah.
Defendant's counsel stated to Plaintiffs counsel's office that the company name should be Memory
Technology, Inc. despite the fact that this was not the company name listed on the contract.
However, even if that were the case, Memory Technology, Inc/s corporate status has been
revoked by the State of Utah.

The contract signed by Scott Rice clearly states at fl 1:
"[i]f advertiser sells or discontinues business before or after publication of the
Directory, no payment or amount due under the terms of this contract will be waived
thereby. The signer of the contract guarantees payment of the amount due either
directly, or through escrow if business is sold..." (emphasis added).
No company by the name of "MTI" or "MTI, Inc." was ever incorporated within the State
of Utah therefore making the signer of the contract personally liable. If MTI does in fact stand for
"Memory Technology, Inc.11 then defendant is still liable for payment pursuant to f 11 of the contract
because the corporate status of the business has expired with the State of Utah thereby making the
corporation essentially out of business.

Furthermore, if the business name was "Memory

Technology, Inc." than defendant should have listed it as such on the contract.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, It is respectfully requested that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be
denied and that Defendant's request for attorney fees be denied.

DATED this

day of May, 2003.

Attorney for Plaintiff

EDWIN B. PARRY [#2532J
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3782 West 2340 South, Suite B
J.Q. Adams Building
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 486-2942
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,
A Debt Collection Agency,
Plaintiff
AFFIDAVIT OF
RAMONA ANDRUS
Civil No: 030200718
SCOTT RICE d.b.a. MTI,
Defendant/s Judge: John C. Backlund

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

RAMONA ANDRUS, being first duly sworn deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am employed by Edwin B. Parry, counsel by Plaintiff herein.

2.

I am competent to testify as to the matters set forth in this Affidavit.

3.

On May 9, 2003,1 received a telephone call from Mr. Blake Atkin, counsel

for Defendant Scott Rice.
4.

Mr. Atkin insisted that he speak with Mr. Parry immediately.

5.

I informed Mr. Atkin that Mr. Parry was out of the office and that I would leave a

message for him to return the phone call
6.

Mr. Atkin insisted that I do something that day to get the complaint against Mr. Rice

dismissed because the Corporation "MTI" was responsible.
7.

I informed Mr. Atkin that Mr. Parry had researched the business "MTI" with the

Department of Commerce and found no listing.

8.

Mr. Atkin then stated that the proper name for the business was "Memory

Technology, Inc."
9.

I told Mr. Atkin that I would pass the information along to Mr. Parry when he

returned to the office.
DATED this

day of May, 2003.

RAMONA ANDRUS

SUBSCRIBED to and sworn before me this

day of May, 2003.

NOTARY PUBLIC

EXHIBIT D

EDWIN B PARRY [#2532]
3782 West 2340 South. Suite B
J Q. Adams Building
West Valley City. Utah 84120
(801) 486-2942

Copy to Plaintiff

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY. OREM DEPARTMENT
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES. INC...

Case No

030200718 DC

(A Debt Collection Agency),

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONITO DISMISS

Plaintiff.

The Honorable: John C. Backlund

vs
SCOTT RICE d b a. MTI.
Defendant

The court having reviewed the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant, l^nd the
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

The court

further finds that there is sufficient cause for Plaintiff to proceed m this
matter

Dated this

^>K

day of July, 2003.

By
The Hoprable John C Backlund
Fourth; En strict Court Judge
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EXHIBIT E

Page 1 of 3
251 Or. 296; Lents v. Borstad;

LENTS, INC., Respondent, v. BORSTAD, Appellant.
[Cite as Lents v. Borstad, 251 Or. 296]
Argued April 5, affirmed October 2, 1968
445 P. 2d 597
Action by creditor of corporation against sole stockholder for dissipation and conversion of assets. The
Circuit Court, Multnomah County, John J. Murchison, J., entered judgment for creditor for corporate debts and
stockholder appealed. The Supreme Court, McAllister, J., held that where corporation after incurring of debt
was dissolved by Corporation Commissioner, and sole stockholder continued to operate business until
corporation filed petition in bankruptcy, and corporation subsequently obtained reinstatements of corporate
franchise, liability of stockholder was not absolved by subsequent reinstatement on theory that reinstatement
operated to cancel dissolution ab initio.
Affirmed.
Corporations—Dissolution, liability of sole stockholder after
1. Where corporation after incurring of debt was dissolved by Corporation Commissioner, and sole stockholder
continued to operate business until corporation filed petition in bankruptcy, and corporation subsequently
obtained reinstatements of corporate franchise, liability of stockholder was not absolved by subsequent
reinstatement on theory that reinstatement operated to cancel dissolution ab initio. ORS 57.585(2) (b, c).
Bankruptcy—Jurisdiction of state court
2. Fact that sole stockholder of corporation had filed petition in bankruptcy listing creditor of corporation as a
creditor did not oust state court of jurisdiction over creditor's action against stockholder.
Judgment—Conformity of findings and judgment—Multiple theories
3. Where corporation's creditor's complaint contained two causes of action against sole stockholder, one for
dissipation of assets and the other for conversion of the same assets, and court found dissipation of assets,
judgment for debt against stockholder personally was not inconsistent with special findings on theory that
judgment did not specify on which cause of action it was based.
See
CJS, Corporations §581.
Department 1.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.
JOHN J. MURCHISON, Judge.
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William Edward Gross, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Deane Sterndale
Bennett, and Fulop, Gross & Saxon, Portland.
Dean P. Gisvold. Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John R. Faust, Jr., and
Cake. Jaureguy, Hardy. Buttler & McEwen, Portland.
Before MCALLISTER, Presiding Justice, and O'CONNELL and HOLMAN, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
MCALLISTER, J.
This is an action for money tried by the court, which found for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
There is no dispute about the controlling facts. The defendant Borstad had been engaged for many years in
the business of installing communications equipment. In 1961 he organized a corporation, Adon, Inc., and
transferred his business to it. He was the president and sole stockholder of the corporation. In October, 1964,
Adon, Inc. incurred a debt of $1,890 to the plaintiff, Lents, Inc., for the installation of electric wiring. Adon,
Inc. did not pay, and in this action plaintiff recovered a judgment for that debt against Borstad personally.
The personal liability of Borstad for the corporate debt is based on the following circumstances. In
December. 1964, Adon, Inc. was dissolved by the Corporation Commissioner for its failure to file annual
reports for 1962 and 1963 and to pay its annual license fees for those years. ORS 57.585 (2) (b). Borstad
claimed that he did not receive the notice of dissolution,

but in any event, he continued to operate the business until October, 1965, when Adon, Inc. filed a petition in
bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy proceeding plaintiff was listed as a creditor of Adon, Inc.
After filing in bankruptcy, Adon, Inc. applied to the Corporation Commissioner for the reinstatement of its
corporate franchise. After filing the required reports and paying the required fees, Adon, Inc. was reinstated on
April 7, 1966. ORS 57.585 (2) (c).
The complaint alleged that when Adon, Inc. was dissolved it was indebted to plaintiff, that its assets
exceeded its liabilities, and that Borstad, instead of winding up the affairs of the corporation, continued to
operate its business, and dissipated its assets, to plaintiffs damage in the sum of $1,890. The court found that
the assets owned by Adon. Inc. as of the date of its dissolution "were dissipated through the continued operation
of the business after dissolution."
On October 19, 1965, Borstad personally filed a petition in bankruptcy, and also listed plaintiff as a creditor.
This action was not filed until February 15, 1966.
Borstad on appeal raises only three narrow questions. In the court below he filed a plea in abatement
alleging in substance that Adon, Inc. was reinstated and that the reinstatement operated nunc pro tunc to cancel
the dissolution ab initio, and absolve Borstad of any liability resulting from his operation of the business while
the corporation was dissolved. The court sustained a demurrer to this plea in abatement, and Borstad assigns
that ruling as error.
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1. Since Borstad does not challenge the basis of his personal liability, i.e., dissipation of the assets while
operating the corporate business after the corporation had been dissolved, we express no opinion about

that part of the case. Borstad contends only that any liability he might have incurred was absolved by the
subsequent reinstatement of the corporation. There is no merit in this contention. If we adopted Borstad's view,
the directors of a corporation could permit it to be dissolved, dissipate its assets, and then escape liability to the
stockholders and creditors by simply reinstating the corporate franchise. The mere statement of the proposition
demonstrates its fallacy. We are not concerned here with the validation of corporate acts between dissolution
and reinstatement.
2. Borstad also filed a plea in abatement alleging that he had filed a petition in bankruptcy and had listed
plaintiff as a creditor. A demurrer to this plea was sustained and that ruling is also assigned as error. This
assignment is equally without merit. The mere filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not oust state courts of
jurisdiction over a suit or action against the bankrupt 1 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed 1968), § 2 61, § 2.62 (4).
3. Borstad contends finally that the judgment is inconsistent with the special findings because the judgment
"does not specify on which cause of action" it is based. The complaint contained two causes of action, one for
dissipation of assets, and the other for conversion of the same assets. The court found dissipation of assets as
alleged in the first cause of action and the judgment is obviously based on that finding. This assignment of error
also lacks merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
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